One of the best arguments I’ve seen for skepticism on Ukraine aid is that it directs resources away from the Indo-Pacific theater, where the U.S. has a much more significant long-term strategic challenge. I disagree with this argument, but it is one that seriously grapples with the long-term security challenges of the United States and deserves to be taken seriously.
Elbridge Colby, an experienced national security professional and former deputy assistant secretary of defense, often makes this argument. He oversaw policy analysis and planning for the DoD and had a role in executing the shift in focus from the Middle East to East Asia.
In my view, his general idea that the U.S. wasted too much time in theaters where it has little long-term strategic interest, like the Middle East, is correct. This is why I supported the withdrawal from Afghanistan and U.S. efforts to minimize its focus on the region.
However, he focuses so much on the threat posed by China, and elevates it so much relative to other concerns, that he ignores regions strategically connected to our competition with China. In fact, degrading Russian capabilities in Europe removes the imperative of needing to fight a two-front war and enhances our long-term ability to redirect resources to East Asia.
What do I mean by a “two-front” war? Broadly speaking, U.S. security doctrine since WWII has emphasized the need to be able to fight a war in two theaters simultaneously. This was the situation in WWII when we fought the Germans in Europe and the Japanese in the Pacific. Today, one of those hypothetical theaters would be East Asia, and the other in Russia, the Middle East, or some other region.
If there is doubt over this capability, then China, or a coalition of allies of China, might be tempted to start a war in another theater to draw the United States in and spread it too thin. Colby feels this is what is happening with the U.S. in its support for Ukraine, but the result is quite the opposite.
We have treaty obligations to Europe that would directly draw the U.S. into a hypothetical war between Russia and NATO countries, like France. We could withdraw from those obligations, but that would signal a lack of commitment by the U.S. towards its allies that would result in more aggressive action by China against Taiwan and potentially a broader regional war in East Asia. Russia would also see a chance to be more aggressive in Europe, and potentially make a move for the Baltic Republics.
So, withdrawing from NATO is off the table, at least if we want to avoid increasing the risk of conflicts in both Europe and Asia. What about withdrawing support from Ukraine, which is a non-NATO country? Well, the rub is the United States is not the only country with security interests in Europe. France has signaled a broader Russian advance in Ukraine is unacceptable, and that it would send troops into Ukraine. It has nuclear weapons and is a NATO ally.
So, we have a security commitment (NATO) we can’t risk withdrawing from, and countries party to that security commitment have a non-negotiable interest in stopping a Russian offensive to conquer Ukraine. Additionally, our response will serve as a signal to China as to whether it can expect free rein in East Asia. To me, the realist position is that we need to help Ukraine stop the Russian advance.
Europe should increase its share of the burden in supplying Ukraine. But, abandoning it entirely, or signaling we might do so, is provocative to our adversaries and is not in our interests. It seems to me, then, that we should arm Ukraine and push for a conclusion to Russia’s invasion that ensures Ukraine retains control of as much of its sovereign territory as possible.
Ukraine aid comes in two types: (1) existing equipment and materials to Ukraine and (2) funding the U.S. defense industry to produce more for Ukraine. Resources are not being diverted from other theaters. Rather, we are pulling existing supplies and stocks of weapons that are either already present in Europe or sitting in storage in the United States. The actual money being spent by the supplemental bill is staying in this country, not being funneled to so-called “corrupt” Ukrainians.
Ukraine has the most immediate need for supplemental aid. Prioritizing it at this juncture makes complete sense. It also does not preclude repositioning U.S. military assets to East Asia and the Indo-Pacific. That has happened and will continue.
While I sympathize with the argument of those like Colby, and largely share their desired ends, the strategy they would like to pursue will not get us closer to being able to deter China in East Asia. In fact, this strategy of leaving Europe to its own devices to focus on China will degrade security globally and signal to our adversaries that America is withdrawing. It will make war more likely as these countries seek the initiative and try to fill the power vacuum being left behind.
American strategy and interests span the globe, and we cannot focus so much one challenge that we ignore other challenges and the linkages between them. Such a strategy would be just as wrong as the excessive focus on the War on Terror and the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. Then, Islamist terrorism was the crisis du jour. Competition with China must not become a similar obsession.